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Capitalist Science
Bruce Knuteson∗
The economic structure of basic science is currently socialist, funded by the public at large through
taxes for the benefit of the public at large. This socialist system should be augmented by a capitalist
system, in which basic science is also funded by private investors who reap financial benefit from the
sale of subsequent technologies based on the knowledge obtained from the research funded by their
investments. A capitalist system will provide benefits extending from the broad target audience of
this paper — which includes politicians, financiers, economists, and scientists in all fields — to the
average taxpayer and consumer. Capitalist science will better align the incentives of scientists with
taxpayer interests, channel more money into basic science, lower your taxes, and generally improve
the quality of your life.
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I. SOCIALIST SCIENCE
Basic science is currently a socialist enterprise, funded
by the taxpayer, with the results available to society at
large. Government agencies centrally plan the bulk of
funding decisions, with peer review providing input to
committees that assist these agencies in selecting projects
for funding. Nobody owns the knowledge that is pro-
duced, which is available at no cost to anyone capable
of reading the resulting publications. From each accord-
ing to his income, to each according to whether he can
read [5].
This socialist science leads to a classic tragedy of the
commons [6]. Since the benefits of scientific advances
are consumed by everyone, no individual has a strong fi-
nancial incentive to invest in basic research. Elementary
game theory suggests that basic science is underfunded
as a direct result of these conditions. More simply stated,
socialist science leads to actions by individuals respond-
ing rationally to their incentives that may not be in the
best interest of society at large. To the extent such a
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problem exists, the cure is not to fault the individuals,
but rather to change the incentives.
It is commonly believed that governments are the in-
stitutions with the longest term perspective, and that
therefore governments should be responsible for funding
basic science. This common perception belies the fact
that the interests of the individual decision makers in
government are actually much shorter in horizon than
the interests of a patient investor. A politician focused
on winning his seat in the next election is unlikely to fight
hard to fund some basic science that will pay off globally
over the next decade. The politician who focuses on the
immediate needs of his constituents is behaving perfectly
rationally in response to his incentives, so faulting him is
not helpful.
Decisions about what science to fund are made by hu-
man beings, and they are therefore obviously affected
at some level by the personal interests of the decision
makers. Each scientist can be expected to have a vested
interest in his own research agenda, and to react more
favorably to proposals that further that agenda than to
those that suggest a different direction. Few scientists
are apt to welcome funding to which they have grown
accustomed being redirected to an area in which they
see themselves having no particular competitive advan-
tage, since the switching costs inherent in changing re-
search direction can be significant. If this approach re-
sults in inefficient science funding decisions, the blame
should not be placed on the scientists involved in those
decisions, who are behaving perfectly rationally in re-
sponse to their incentives. Nor should scientists, who as
a group expend considerable effort attempting to ensure
a fair and thoughtful process of review, be accused of
harboring an unwillingness to do the right thing.
Younger scientists who may not yet be involved in
funding decisions perform their research in the context
of an incentive structure that varies somewhat from field
to field. Across most fields, number of publications and
number of citations are two often used measures of a sci-
entist’s contribution to his field. Young scientists there-
fore naturally focus on producing publications that are
apt to be highly cited, and those that do this most suc-
cessfully are promoted and have the opportunity to be-
come old scientists. The use of measures like number
2of publications and number of citations may seem rea-
sonable, appearing to capture both the quantity and im-
pact of a scientist’s work. Unless the goal of the average
American taxpayer is to maximize the total number of
citations, there is a serious disconnect between the goals
of the young scientist and the goals of those ultimately
funding his research. The young scientist is not culpable
since he is behaving perfectly rationally in the context
of his environment, and he can hardly be blamed for the
evolved misalignment of his incentives and those of the
taxpayer.
Because socialist science ensures underfunded science
through a tragedy of the commons, many young scien-
tists will grow into something other than old scientists.
The young scientist who seeks an alternative occupation
in response to price signals is very probably acting ra-
tionally in response to his incentives. In particular, the
fact that his career change may slightly harm society at
large, which could benefit more from the basic research
advances he would make than from whatever he will do
in his new and more highly compensated occupation, is
not really his problem.
The underfunding of science results in some useful sci-
ence not getting done. As one of many examples, the cli-
mate change problem currently being faced by the world
is a large one, and one that could benefit from additional
basic science research related to the problem. Incentives
for individual scientists to perform basic research rele-
vant to the problem are not of the same magnitude as
the problem.
Given the value most scientists place on measurement,
current technology for quantitatively tracking scientific
progress is primitive. Very few papers explicitly quantify
how beliefs in the clearly and fully articulated hypotheses
considered should be updated in light of the work pre-
sented therein. The resulting ambiguity severely ham-
pers attempts to draw broader quantitative conclusions
from multiple related papers. These observations come
as no surprise, since the current funding process provides
no particular incentive for authors to quantify results in
a manner amenable to further quantitative inference.
For those unwilling to measure scientific progress by
the total number of citations, tracking scientific progress
requires tracking how beliefs in various proposed hy-
potheses change. For the public at large, changing be-
liefs in proposed hypotheses are currently tracked in occa-
sional news stories, with particularly interesting dramas
summarized long after their time in the odd history of
science book. Changes of beliefs in proposed hypotheses
are not available in real time, on the web. Imagine if fi-
nancial information were not available in real time, on the
web, and the only information anyone received regarding
changes of beliefs in hypotheses related to the modern
economy were from occasional news stories and the odd
popular book. Although such limited information avail-
ability might be suitable for somebody following along at
home, it is wholly unsuitable for the active practitioner.
Socialist science, which lacks incentives for such real time
tracking of beliefs in proposed hypotheses, is missing a
market consensus. The extent to which an absence of
quantitative, real time belief tracking has been slowing
scientific progress will not be widely appreciated until it
is commonplace [7].
The problems with socialist science, although not suf-
ficiently disastrous to prevent some good science from
getting done, may motivate brief consideration of an al-
ternative. The purpose of this paper is to propose that
the current socialist science system be augmented with
capitalist science. The proposal is described in Sec. II,
with Sec. III summarizing. Appendix A provides some
additional commentary, noting potential criticisms and
providing brief rejoinders. For those interested in more
technical details, Appendix B provides an example of
how this might look in practice, and Appendix C makes
a connection to the related ideas of Refs. [1, 2]. The
proposal is a minor extension of ideas that are already
mainstream: that capitalism has certain advantages over
socialism, that basic science tends to spur subsequent
technological innovation and improvement of standard of
living, and that individual incentives matter.
II. CAPITALIST SCIENCE
The proposal advanced in this article is nonetheless
sufficiently different from current practice that it may
take some time before the underlying logic is fully ap-
preciated. The reader will be forgiven if the overview
provided in this section strikes him as fanciful until af-
ter reading Appendices A and B, which describe in more
detail how this will work in practice. It may be use-
ful to think of the proposal (very loosely) as a cross be-
tween financial markets and the patent system, both of
which manage to function roughly as intended, but each
of which would be laughable if introduced from scratch
to a new audience in a three page paper.
Augmenting socialist science with capitalist science
will require an act of Congress. New legislation needs
to be passed that applies a small tax on companies’ rev-
enue, starting some time (say ten years) in the future.
This tax is distributed in full to those responsible for
the knowledge making the products and services of these
companies possible, as detailed in Appendix B. Those
who bristle at the word “tax” should note that this pro-
posal represents a direct redistribution rather than an
increase in funds over which the government has spend-
ing discretion. As discussed in Appendix A, this proposal
will actually decrease taxes. Rather than asking current
taxpayers to fund science they do not understand for the
benefit of who knows who at some undetermined point in
the future, the people in the future who actually benefit
from the knowledge gained will pay the people who fund
today’s research.
Using round numbers for the purpose of illustration,
suppose the tax rate Congress decides to apply to com-
panies’ revenues starting in ten years is 1%. If the gross
3domestic product of the United States ten years from
now is $20T, then ten years from now a total of $200B
will be paid to people who have invested in scientific re-
search in the interim. Applying an appropriate discount
for the passage of time, there exist reasonable accounting
choices for which this tax revenue roughly approximates
the current funding of socialist science.
The $1 or so of tax on each $100 of company revenue
is divided among those who have contributed to produc-
ing the knowledge necessary for their products and ser-
vices to work as intended, in a manner described in Ap-
pendix B. The division rewards studies that have signif-
icantly increased beliefs in hypotheses whose correctness
is necessary for their products or services to work as de-
signed.
Given the amount of money involved, new and existing
companies start focusing on basic science shortly after
the legislation is passed. Basic science suddenly becomes
entrepreneurial, a quality that has been lost in some more
mature scientific fields. A person with a clever idea can
actually get paid for generating useful knowledge about
how the world works. Funds raise money from investors
to sponsor the development of these clever ideas. Some
of the resulting research enterprises grow over time and
become publicly traded companies, with revenue coming
from the people buying products whose development has
relied on the improved understanding of nature resulting
from the company’s research. The investors who fund
tomorrow’s scientific breakthroughs receive improved risk
adjusted returns through the additional diversification
this investment alternative provides. Portfolio managers
with science backgrounds have a financial incentive to
identify the most promising research. Many of the best
scientists start funding their research from private money
rather than from government grants, since research done
with private money has a financial upside not present in
government funded research, which is ineligible for a cut
of the tax on companies’ revenue. With fewer scientists
continuing to rely on government funding, the fraction of
the federal budget devoted to supporting socialist science
gradually decreases, and portions adequately replaced by
capitalist science are eventually largely phased out.
Professional forty-year-olds with another forty years
ahead of them, representing a group with significant ag-
gregate investment capacity, have a risk tolerance com-
mensurate with the risk of basic research. The size of
this investment pool is an important determinant in how
quickly capitalist science supplants socialist science, since
these are the investors who are funding today’s capital-
ist science. Investments in companies (both public and
private) that perform basic science research become a
standard part of the average investor’s portfolio, with a
portfolio weight that decreases with investor age. The
same secondary market that allows an investor to cash
out of his investment in IBM before realizing all future
cash flows allows an investor to cash out of his invest-
ment in a basic science company before realizing all fu-
ture cash flows, with the usual constraint that he can
only sell his investment at a price somebody else is will-
ing to pay. Funds are developed to provide individual
investors diversified exposure to a range of scientific re-
search, in the same way that some mutual funds today
currently provide an easy way for investors to obtain di-
versified exposure to a range of stocks of companies with
traditional revenue streams.
A database of beliefs in proposed hypotheses is used
to track the changes in beliefs on which payouts are
based, as described in Appendix B. A study testing
some hypothesis against its negative may motivate a
database update that quantifies the authors’ view of how
the study performed should affect our belief in the cor-
rectness of that hypothesis. Scholarship is no longer pub-
lished in academic journals. Publication takes the form of
a database entry, consisting of the authors’ specification
of one or more numbers between zero and unity reflect-
ing updated beliefs in one or more hypotheses, together
with a non-peer-reviewed paper providing the details of
the study. A single database update may simultaneously
change beliefs in multiple hypotheses. New hypotheses
are entered through a database update consisting of a
complete articulation of the hypothesis and an initial be-
lief that the hypothesis is correct. The current state of
the database, all updates to the database, and the com-
plete history of the database are all fully accessible to
everyone at no cost.
Each company identifies those hypotheses in the
database whose veracity (or falsity) is necessary for their
products or services to work as intended. When final-
ized, money is moved from the company’s account to
and among the accounts of those responsible for relevant
database entries. Each author receives a fraction of the
revenue proportional to the information gain he has pro-
vided in favor of nature working in such a way that each
product or service functions as intended, as specified in
more detail in the example in Appendix B. Claims on fu-
ture revenue expire fifty years after publication. Authors
who turn out to be wrong owe an amount proportional
to the negative information gain they have provided. All
payments are tracked and fully publicly disclosed on the
web, with disputes handled by an administrative agency.
The resulting market is big enough to attract arbi-
trageurs who systematically look for beliefs that are likely
to be incorrect, and who make their money by updating
the database with more accurate beliefs. Since partici-
pants can lose money by being wrong, adequate insurance
is required for any participant desiring to assume signif-
icant exposure. The database itself needs to be robust
but not particularly complicated, and is run by a small
but competent group within the Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
III. SUMMARY
The economic structure of basic science is currently
socialist, funded by the public at large through taxes for
4the benefit of the public at large. This socialist science
should be augmented by capitalist science, in which ba-
sic science is also funded by private investors who reap
financial benefit from the sale of subsequent technolo-
gies based on the knowledge obtained from the research
funded by their investments.
A short article intended for a broad readership clearly
cannot hope to address all issues that could be raised of
a proposal of this scale. Appendix A provides brief, non-
technical responses to some anticipated questions. Tech-
nical readers interested in perusing a worked example are
encouraged to consult Appendix B, and those already fa-
miliar with the arguments of Refs [1, 2] may find helpful
the tie to previous work made in Appendix C.
The heart of the idea proposed in this article is a re-
structuring of incentives that better aligns the interests
of scientists and those funding their research. Expected
direct effects include more money being channeled into
basic science despite a reduction in government spend-
ing, better use of this money from the viewpoint of the
taxpayer, and a resultant improved quality of life when
you retire.
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Appendix A: Criticisms and rejoinders
A few anticipated miscellaneous criticisms and brief
responses are provided in a bit of give and take below.
Won’t this stifle the openness of basic science? No.
This proposal will actually increase the openness of basic
science by providing a financial incentive for publishing
potentially useful results.
Are you raising taxes? No. The proposed tax on com-
panies’ revenue starting on some future date that will pay
today’s investors in basic science does not change the pool
of money over which the government has spending dis-
cretion, since the full amount of the tax goes directly and
formulaically to private investors. To the extent govern-
ment funded science is successfully replaced by capitalist
science, the public’s tax burden is actually decreased.
Why 1%? A tax rate of 1% is used as a round number
for the purpose of this paper. Suppose the tax is set to
start in ten years, or perhaps is set to phase in gradu-
ally from five to fifteen years hence, starting at 0.1% in
2016 and increasing by 0.1% per year to 1.0% in 2025.
The net present value of the tax revenue per year ten
years out approximates the government’s annual science
funding today. The amount of private money invested in
basic science will be proportional to whatever rate is set.
A rate on the order of 1% is probably large enough to
incentivize basic research without being so large that it
disincentivizes commercialization of what is learned. It
also happens to be roughly the rate skimmed by the fi-
nancial sector on every transaction paid for with plastic,
a service that arguably provides far less social value.
How can you possibly determine the expected future tax
revenue two decades from now that might come from some
basic science research done today? In much the same way
you value the worth of owning a share of IBM: with dif-
ficulty. Of course, this difficulty in valuation is precisely
why you expect (in aggregate) to receive a greater return
on your (riskier) investment in basic science than on your
(less risky) investment in a blue chip corporate bond.
How does this differ from patents? Speaking loosely,
patents are granted for inventions that do something you
might want to do. A patent gives the patent holder the
right to exclude others from utilizing the invention. In
contrast, capitalist science gives people who increase our
knowledge of how nature works a claim on a fixed fraction
of future cash flows from the sale of those products and
services that rely on this knowledge.
What keeps authors from overstating their results? Au-
thors have to pay if they are wrong, as described in
Appendix B. Assuming a set of hypotheses with equal
expected revenue streams, a simple calculation shows
that self-interested, risk neutral scientists will want to
publish database updates equal to their actual beliefs
to maximize their expected payoff. Self-interested, risk
averse scientists will systematically understate their re-
sults, publishing “conservative” updates that deviate less
from existing database values than their analyses imply.
This hypothesis database actually seems pretty cool.
Can I have it without changing science funding? No.
Beliefs in the hypothesis database are valuable precisely
because there is money on the line. Although this article
leads with a capitalist approach to science funding and
notes, seemingly incidentally, the necessity of a hypoth-
esis database, it is equally valid to lead with the goal of
a hypothesis database and note, seemingly incidentally,
the necessity of a capitalist approach to science funding.
What keeps companies from misidentifying hypotheses
that need to be correct for their products and services to
function as intended? All companies will lose 1% of rev-
enue, with the bulk of this loss presumably passed along
to the consumer. Misallocating the 1% is apt to trigger
a dispute, the anticipated cost of which incentivizes the
company to allocate correctly.
Since the paper submitted by the authors as part of a
database update is not subject to peer review, and since
all that seems to matter is the changes the authors make
to beliefs, what motivates authors to write a high qual-
ity paper explaining what they have done? Authors who
feel disadvantaged by some falsehood or obscurity in a
paper submitted with another author’s database entry
are able to initiate an administrative proceeding against
that author for revenues they believe they lost due to
that falsehood or obscurity. This recourse gives authors
5a financial incentive to produce clear, detailed papers to
accompany database updates.
You seem to be relying on an administrative agency
for all of the messy decisions. Aren’t you just passing the
buck to a bunch of lawyers? No. In most cases the sys-
tem will work automatically, as advertised, and without
lawyers. In a few cases, just as with patents, disputes
will need to be resolved by humans with appropriate ex-
pertise.
Why should I believe the government will follow
through and actually impose a future 1% tax, even if it
promises to do so now? The government’s enacting of
capitalist science will create many new jobs, for nonsci-
entists as well as scientists, as investment funds are cre-
ated to channel money into basic science in anticipation
of the promised tax revenue. By failing to impose the
1% tax at some point in the future after promising to
do so, the government would obliterate the jobs created
in anticipation of this tax revenue. For better or worse,
the government has historically been quite responsive to
political pressure arising from concentrated job losses.
Won’t the tax, which can only be applied to domestic
companies, give foreign companies an advantage? Adopt-
ing a policy whereby authors of database entries from
other countries get their share if and only if company
revenues in that country are subject to the same tax en-
sures that the exchange of money is contained within the
set of participating countries. The adoption of capitalist
science by other countries, as with patent protection in
much of the developed world, carries certain advantages.
Won’t this proposal lead to more shortsighted research?
This proposal may in many ways actually lead to de-
cisions with greater foresight. As a specific example,
with the exception of Refs. [3, 4], little to no attempt
is made to retain data from expensive particle physics
experiments, since it is not really in the interest of any
individual physicist to go to the trouble. Capitalist sci-
ence provides a direct financial incentive to retain data
from an expensive study in a manner that lends itself to
the quick testing of additional hypotheses in the future.
Do you seriously think Congress might pass this? In
addition to its intrinsic merit, this proposal has elements
that should appeal to both political parties. The first
half of the bipartisan, two word title of this article is
stereotypically associated with Republicans, and the sec-
ond with Democrats.
Any policy change has winners and losers. Who wins
from this proposal, and who loses? The primary moti-
vation for this proposal is the expectation that society
will be better off thirty years from now if it is adopted
than if it is not. More quality basic science will get done,
which will lead to increased knowledge, improved prod-
ucts and services, and increased quality of life. The av-
erage taxpayer wins because he gets more by paying an
extra 1% on things that might be otherwise unavailable
or unaffordable than by paying taxes for basic science
that may never result in something he will use. Investors
win with greater risk adjusted returns due to the ad-
ditional diversification that investment in basic science
provides. Clever, innovative scientists win because new
breakthroughs are accompanied by significant financial
upside. The only people who lose are scientists receiv-
ing taxpayer funding for doing research that lacks the
promise of producing interesting technologies within a
typical young person’s lifetime. For understandable, self-
interested reasons, this group is likely to raise the most
vociferous objections to this proposal.
Appendix B: Example
A simplified example illustrates how the proposal out-
lined above would work in practice. This appendix (and
the one following) are somewhat technical, and are tar-
geted at a much narrower readership than the main text
of this article.
A hypothesis database is used to track changes in be-
liefs of proposed hypotheses. Although updates to the
hypothesis database occur in continuous time, for book-
keeping purposes the tth database update can be consid-
ered to occur at time t. A generic analysis or experiment
x affects our belief in some hypothesis y [8]. An analysis
or experiment xt motivates an update to the database at
time t. A subscript on y labels a specific hypothesis. The
probability (likelihood) of seeing the outcome x assuming
the correctness of the hypothesis y is p(x|y). The proba-
bility of obtaining the result xt assuming the correctness
of the hypothesis y and given the knowledge of database
entries up to and including time t − 1 is p(xt|y, t − 1),
where a single number (t − 1) encapsulates all informa-
tion available in the database up to and including time
t − 1. In general, any analysis or experiment will test
competing hypotheses, such as a hypothesis y and its
negative y/. Such an analysis xt will then lead to an up-
date to the database p(y|t), a number between zero and
unity reflecting the belief that y is correct at time t, by
applying standard Bayesian logic to information available
in the database at time t− 1.
A new hypothesis is entered through a database up-
date consisting of a complete articulation of the hypoth-
esis and a value for the prior, which is an initial belief
that the hypothesis is correct. This update is public,
as is the statement of the hypothesis and the proposed
value for the prior. To ensure a fair initial belief, such
an update starts an auction period lasting two weeks.
During this time other participants have an opportunity
to submit different values for the prior. No information
submitted during the auction becomes public until the
auction period ends, at which time all submitted informa-
tion becomes public. Upon the conclusion of the auction,
the prior on the hypothesis is set equal to the geometric
mean of the submitted values. Every participant sub-
mitting a prior has economic exposure to the value he
submits. The rationale for this auction should become
clear through the example provided in this appendix.
The example narrated below is summarized as entries
6TABLE I: Entries into the toy database corresponding to the
example narrated in the text. Each numbered row represents
the database entry resulting from the correspondingly
numbered paragraph in the text. The entry’s author is given
in the second column, and the entry itself is provided in
the third column. These entries produce a database whose
state at time t is shown in Table II. †The first database
entry of a hypothesis is determined by an auction, in
which values for priors are solicited and a geometric mean of
these values is entered in the database as the hypothesis prior.
t Author Entry
1 † p(yMary) = 0.000206
2 Dawn p(yMary) = 0.03
3 Mary p(yMary) = 0.9999999
4 † p(yKathy) = 0.00000728
5 Kathy p(yKathy) = 0.9999999
6 Anne p(yMary) = 0.9999
7 Mary p(yMary) = 0.9999999999
8 † p(ySarah) = 0.0299
9 Sarah p(ySarah) = 0.999
TABLE II: State of the toy database corresponding to
the example narrated in the text, providing beliefs in the
hypotheses yMary, yKathy, and ySarah at each time t. The
state of the database at time t reflects the database entries
in Table I up to and including time t. New database entries
are marked with an asterisk.
t p(yMary) p(yKathy) p(ySarah)
1 0.000206*
2 0.03*
3 0.9999999*
4 0.9999999 0.00000728*
5 0.9999999 0.9999999*
6 0.9999* 0.9999999
7 0.9999999999* 0.9999999
8 0.9999999999 0.9999999 0.0299*
9 0.9999999999 0.9999999 0.999*
into a toy hypothesis database in Table I, with each num-
bered paragraph t corresponding to one database entry.
These entries give rise to a database whose cumulative
state at time t is summarized in Table II.
1. Mary suspects various cancers all have a common
feature. She realizes she can test her hypothesis
yMary conclusively at low marginal cost given her
company’s existing infrastructure. Mary suspects
her field would estimate the probability of yMary
being correct at 10−4, but she has obtained prelim-
inary data that cause her to estimate this probabil-
ity at 10−3. Mary convinces her company to enter
a prior of 2× 10−4 into the hypothesis database. It
is in Mary’s company’s interest to enter Mary’s hy-
pothesis and a value for the prior into the database,
since otherwise they will not make any money pub-
lishing the results of the analysis Mary intends to
perform. During the auction period over the next
two weeks, additional priors of 3× 10−4, 3× 10−5,
and 10−3 are entered. When the auction has closed
at time t = 1, p(yMary|1) is set at 2.06× 10
−4, the
geometric mean of the four priors.
2. Mary then performs her test over the next few
months. Before she is ready to publish, her former
college roommate Dawn, working at a competing
company, performs a quick and dirty analysis x2
and finds log10
p(x2|yMary,1)
p(x2|6yMary,1)
= +2.13. Applying the
usual rules of Bayesian inference [9] , she publishes
p(yMary|2) = 3× 10
−2 to the database.
3. After significant discussion within Mary’s com-
pany regarding her analysis x3, her company con-
cludes log10
p(x3|yMary,2)
p(x3|6yMary,2)
= +9.2, and publishes
p(yMary|3) = 1− 10
−7 to the database.
4. Shortly thereafter, Kathy suspects that this feature
shared by various cancers may be altered when in
solution with a substance possessing a particular
characteristic [10]. Kathy suspects her field would
estimate the probability of yKathy being correct at
10−6, but she has an argument that causes her
to put this probability at 10−2. Kathy convinces
her company to enter a prior of 1.5 × 10−5 into
the hypothesis database. During the auction pe-
riod over the next two weeks, additional priors of
4×10−4, 1.7×10−5, 10−6, and 2×10−7 are entered.
When the auction has closed, p(yKathy|4) is set at
7.28× 10−6, the geometric mean of the five priors.
5. Kathy then performs her analysis x5 over the
next year, eventually finding log10
p(x5|yKathy,4)
p(x5|6yKathy,4)
=
+12.6, and convinces her company to publish
p(yKathy|5) = 1− 10
−7 to the database.
6. Anne performs a study x6, spots what she
thinks is an error in Mary’s analysis, ar-
gues log10
p(x6|yMary,5)
p(x6|6yMary,5)
= −3.2, and publishes
p(yMary|6) = 1− 10
−4 to the database.
7. Mary defends and extends her previous analysis in
a study x7, argues log10
p(x7|yMary,6)
p(x7|6yMary,6)
= +7.5, and
convinces her company to publish p(yMary|7) = 1−
10−10 to the database.
8. Soon thereafter, Sarah realizes it may be possi-
ble to prevent cancer cells from replicating with a
treatment that uses a particular substance with the
characteristic noted by Kathy to attack the com-
mon feature noted by Mary. Sarah convinces her
company to publish a prior of 2 × 10−2 on her hy-
pothesis ySarah, which seems somewhat plausible
given the current state of the field. During the
subsequent auction period, priors of 3×10−2, 10−2,
78× 10−2, and 5× 10−2 are entered. When the auc-
tion has closed, p(ySarah|8) is set at 2.99×10
−2, the
geometric mean of the five priors.
9. Sarah then quickly does an analysis x9, finds
log10
p(x9|ySarah,8)
p(x9|6ySarah,8)
= +5.1, and convinces her com-
pany to publish p(ySarah|9) = 1 − 10
−3 to the
database.
Six years later, after clinical tests, a treatment is avail-
able that cures several forms of cancer in 90% of pa-
tients with tolerable side effects. The product begins to
save millions of lives per year, and generates a revenue of
$4.2B in 2020 for companies operating in or engaging in
trade with the United States.
The companies selling this product are required by the
Capitalist Science Act of 2012 to identify the hypotheses
in the database (or their negatives) that are necessary for
the product to work as intended. By 2020, the database
contains millions of hypotheses. Of the hypotheses in the
database in 2020, many have a posterior (current belief)
sufficiently close to the prior (set by the initial auction
for that hypothesis) that the money made by the au-
thors who provided evidence for the hypothesis is negli-
gible [11]. Among the hypotheses in the database in 2020
for which the evidence provided is non-negligible, only
yMary, yKathy, and ySarah are identified as being necessary
for the cancer cure to function as intended. Authors who
provided evidence in favor of two other related hypothe-
ses initiate an administrative proceeding, arguing that
these two related hypotheses also need to be true for the
product to function as intended, but the administrative
agency charged with handling such disputes concludes
that the product could plausibly function as intended
even if these two related hypotheses are not true.
From the last row in Table II, p(yMary, yKathy, ySarah|9)
≈ 1. The total information gain in this example, cal-
culated as described in Refs. [1, 2] and approximating
p(yMary, yKathy, ySarah|9) as unity, is
total information gain ≈ −log10p(yMary, yKathy, ySarah|1).
(B1)
Unfortunately, p(yMary, yKathy, ySarah|1) is not in the
database. As indicated by empty space in Table II, there
is no notion of yKathy or ySarah at time t = 1. Use
of available information therefore requires assuming the
independence of database hypotheses, and for practical
purposes using
total information gain ≈ − (log10p(yMary|1)+
log10p(yKathy|4) +
log10p(ySarah|8))
= 10.3. (B2)
The evidence provided by each database entry in favor
of yMary, yKathy, or ySarah is shown in Table III, together
with the payoff to the author of each database entry for
TABLE III: Evidence provided in each database entry in the
example narrated in the text. The evidence provided in favor
of hypothesis y by database entry t is log10(p(y|t)/p(y|t− 1)).
Payouts, determined by dividing this evidence by the total
information gain calculated in Eq. B2 and multiplying by
1% of the total revenue, are shown (in $M) in the rightmost
column. †The first database entry of a hypothesis is an
auction, in which values for priors are solicited and a geomet-
ric mean of these values is entered as the hypothesis prior.
Participants in these auctions other than this example’s main
cast of characters are simply labeled “Bidder”. Each auction
is a zero sum game, with a net payout of $0.
t Author Evidence Hypothesis Payout ($M)
1 † yMary
Mary - 0.01 - 0.05
Bidder #1 + 0.2 + 0.7
Bidder #2 - 0.8 - 3.4
Bidder #3 + 0.7 + 2.8
2 Dawn + 2.2 yMary + 8.8
3 Mary + 1.5 yMary + 6.2
4 † yKathy
Kathy + 0.3 + 1.3
Bidder #1 + 1.7 + 7.1
Bidder #2 + 0.4 + 1.5
Bidder #3 - 0.9 - 3.5
Bidder #4 - 1.6 - 6.3
5 Kathy + 5.1 yKathy +20.9
6 Anne - 0.00004 yMary - 0.0002
7 Mary + 0.00004 yMary + 0.0002
8 † ySarah
Sarah - 0.2 - 0.7
Bidder #1 + 0.001 + 0.004
Bidder #2 - 0.5 - 1.9
Bidder #3 + 0.4 + 1.7
Bidder #4 + 0.2 + 0.9
9 Sarah + 1.5 ySarah + 6.2
Total +10.3 +42.0
the publication of that entry. Assuming a 1% tax on
$4.2B of revenue in 2020, a total of $42M is paid to au-
thors of database entries for this product. Kathy’s com-
pany gets nearly half ($20.9M) of this total for making
the most surprising discovery. Dawn makes more ($8.8M)
than Mary does ($6.2M) by beating her to the punch,
although with a less thorough analysis. In the auction
determining the prior of yKathy, Bidder #1 makes a fair
amount ($7.1M) at the expense of Bidder #4 (−$6.3M)
for assigning a larger probability that yKathy might be
true. Each separate auction is a zero sum game, with as
much money lost as made among auction participants.
8Anne loses a bit of change ($200) for incorrectly providing
evidence against yMary. Sarah’s company makes $5.5M,
somewhat less than they would have made if they hadn’t
been outguessed in the auction for the prior on ySarah.
Appendix C: Previous work
The proposal of this article is the third in a set of pro-
posals of gradually increasing scope. Reference [1] pro-
poses a measure of experimental scientific merit, arguing
that more is learned from a surprising experimental re-
sult than an unsurprising result, and that the scientific
merit of two results should be invariant to whether they
are published in a single article or in two separate arti-
cles. The experimental scientific merit of Ref. [1] pro-
vides a reasonable measure of experimental progress to-
wards answering the big questions in a particular field of
science. It does not address the scientific merit of the-
oretical work, how the big questions are chosen, or how
research funds are allocated among different fields.
Reference [2] notes that the proposal of Ref. [1] applies
equally well to theoretical research, can be used to com-
pare experimental and theoretical research on the same
footing, and represents an appropriate measure of overall
scientific merit. As in Ref. [1], the proposal in Ref. [2]
assumes the existence of the big questions that define a
single scientific field, and does not address how the big
questions are chosen, or how research funds are allocated
among different fields.
The proposal in this article, which extends the propos-
als in Refs. [1, 2] by providing a market solution to these
remaining questions, includes the previous proposals as
a limiting case. Temporarily adopting the notation of
these previous articles, let Y = {y1, . . . , yj, . . . , ym} rep-
resent a complete and orthogonal set of distinct states of
knowledge as to how nature works, defined with respect
to the big questions in some particular field of science,
and let X = {x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn} represent a complete
and orthogonal set of possible outcomes of some exper-
iment. Assuming yj is true, let R(yj) represent the net
present value of all revenue that will be generated by
products relying on yj being true, and assume for conve-
nience a tax rate of 1%. The expected payoff to a person
who performs the experiment and obtains the result xi
is then
〈payoff〉 = 1%
∑
j
R(yj)p(yj |xi)log10
p(yj|xi)
p(yj)
, (C1)
where p(yj |xi) is the belief in yj given the experimen-
tal outcome xi, and p(yj) is the prior on yj . It may in
some cases be plausible to assert that the net present
value of all revenue that will be generated by products
relying on yj being true is roughly the same, within con-
siderable estimation uncertainty, for all j. The simplify-
ing assumption R(yj) = R for all j leads to 〈payoff〉 ∝
information gain(xi), where
information gain(xi) =
∑
j
p(yj|xi)log10
p(yj |xi)
p(yj)
(C2)
is the figure of merit proposed in Refs. [1, 2] for evaluating
completed scientific research. If the experiment has not
yet been performed, so that the outcome xi is not yet
known, then
〈payoff〉 = 1%
∑
i
p(xi)
∑
j
R(yj)p(yj |xi)log10
p(yj |xi)
p(yj)
.
(C3)
The same simplifying assumption that R(yj) = R for all
j leads to 〈payoff〉 ∝ ∆H , where
∆H =
∑
i,j
p(xi, yj)log10
p(yj|xi)
p(yj)
(C4)
is the expected reduction in information entropy, the
figure of merit proposed in Refs. [1, 2] for evaluating
proposed scientific research. From the point of view of
this article, Refs. [1, 2] thus implicitly assume equal net
present values of revenues generated by products relying
on each hypothesis being true, within estimation errors.
“Qualitatively distinct states of knowledge” in Refs. [1, 2]
are reinterpreted in the context of this proposal to refer
to models of nature in which different technologies are
possible.
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